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and use precision-guided munitions,
such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, to
destroy them. Not surprisingly, the
combination of space-based systems
has significantly improved U.S. maritime as well as military capabilities.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of
Friedman’s work is the sheer volume of
data that it contains. The reader is led
through discussions of the development
of space launchers, including detailed
reviews of the U.S. and Soviet programs. Friedman is quite comfortable
discussing the development of these
technologies and thus easily examines
how the United States has integrated
space technologies into everyday military operations. This descriptive material is quite useful for those not familiar
with many of the technologies and capabilities that exist under the rubric of
space systems. The central value of
Seapower and Space is to help the reader
understand the technological and operational forces that have changed how
the U.S. defense establishment, most
notably its naval component, goes
about its business.
All told, Friedman’s work is useful because of its breadth and depth. Yet in
many chapters the analytic foundations
of the work are obscured by the exceptionally detailed discussions of the evolution of, for example, rocket programs,
communications systems, satellite programs, and cruise missile programs, to
name a few. For readers who are more
interested in how space systems support
maritime operations, these details
prove somewhat distracting.
How, then, should we judge the value
of Friedman’s work? The overall quality
of the research and writing speaks for
itself. The chapters are tightly organized
and lucid, which reaffirms that the
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author is knowledgeable about naval
matters. This is a useful work that by
contributing to the literature on the relationship between space and naval operations exposes the reader to a wide
range of systems and technologies that
are fundamental to the capabilities possessed by modern navies and military
forces. As a history of space and maritime systems, it contributes new and
useful particulars, background, and insights into how space systems help the
naval commanders. My only wish is
that he could have focused less on programmatic details. That being said,
Friedman’s work represents an important step toward analyzing how space
represents the next set of technologies
that will revolutionize naval operations
in the future.
WILLIAM C. MARTEL

Naval War College
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One of the most intriguing questions
about the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) today is whether its communist
government does or does not have the
“ambition” to acquire a blue-water
navy. If building an oceangoing fleet
is among Beijing’s long-term goals,
then China may one day become a dangerous peer competitor of the United
States. If so, a future Sino-U.S. maritime conflict is possible; if not, Washington’s primarily maritime power and
Beijing’s primarily continental power
need never meet in battle.
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The two books discussed here focus on
different aspects of China and so answer this question in radically different
ways. Robyn Lim examines Far Eastern
geopolitics and history to address the
issue of Sino-U.S. conflict. Focusing on
the numerous twentieth-century wars
fought among the East Asian quadrilateral—the United States, China, Japan,
and Russia—Lim concludes that a new
“great-power war” is “thinkable” and
that such a conflict would probably be
maritime in nature: “If China, a rising
continental power, is indeed seeking
domination over East Asia and its contiguous waters, this pattern of conflict
is set to continue—because the United
States, with its own maritime security at
stake, is bound to stand in China’s way.”

Tokyo, be prepared to stop a PRC attack on Taiwan, dampen the rising
tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and
redirect future Chinese maritime expansion into more peaceful directions.
Lim cautions that too strident a policy
might push China into a corner, leading to irrational decisions on Beijing’s
part—much as Washington’s 1941 failure to deter Tokyo resulted in the miscalculated decision to attack Pearl
Harbor. However, Lim concludes that
in the coming years a certain degree of
great-power conflict will probably be
unavoidable, since “when China
started to demonstrate blue water
ambition, it was certain to collide with
America’s interest as the global ‘offshore balancer.’ ”

The underlying reason for a possible future Sino-U.S. conflict, says Lim, is Japan’s defeat in World War II, coupled
with the Soviet Union’s collapse in
1991. Not only has Russia’s precipitous
decline given China “strategic latitude
unprecedented in modern times,” but
the waning security threat along the
Sino-Russian border has allowed
Beijing to point “east and south strategically, pressing on the vital straits that
connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans.”
In light of Russia’s decision to sell massive amounts of military equipment—
dominated by ships, planes, and naval
weaponry—to China, possible SinoU.S. flashpoints include a PRC invasion
or blockade of Taiwan, international
conflict on the Korean Peninsula, maritime tensions with Japan over the
Senkaku (in Chinese, Diaoyutai) Islands, and Southeast Asian resistance to
China’s self-proclaimed sovereignty
over the South China Sea.

Thomas Kane examines the future of
China’s navy in Chinese Grand Strategy
and Maritime Power. Studying the history of Chinese grand strategy, which
has most recently included calls for
the creation of a “new order” among
the world’s great states, Kane concludes that “if China wishes to claim a
leading role in international politics, it
must become a seapower,” which
means, in turn, that “maritime development is one of the most prominent
and most challenging goals of the
PRC’s [grand] strategy.”

To offset such a conflict, Washington
must ally itself even more closely with
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To support his point, Kane argues that
for thousands of years the Chinese were
among the world’s great practitioners
of seapower. From the sixteenth to the
mid-twentieth century, however,
China’s navy stagnated, only to be born
anew during the 1950s, when Mao
Zedong proclaimed that China should
develop a strong fleet. In 1979, Deng
Xiaoping helped to make Mao’s dream
a reality, redirecting an ever larger share
of the defense budget to the People’s
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Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Not
only was a strong navy necessary to exploit maritime resources in the surrounding seas, including enormous
reserves of fish, oil, and natural gas, but
“until the Chinese have an oceangoing
navy, their freedom to trade will depend upon the goodwill of others.
China’s leaders understand this fact,
and are determined to remedy it.”
During the twenty-first century, the
Chinese navy is bound to grow. It is no
match for the U.S. Navy, but Kane cautions that just because “China’s navy
remains materially weak does not mean
that it is strategically useless.” In fact,
the PLAN is clearly “designed to serve a
purpose in war,” and if “one reflects
upon how China’s navy measures up to
the tasks Beijing is putting it to, and
combines those reflections with a consideration of how the Chinese fleet may
develop over time, the PLAN begins to
seem more adequate.”
China’s primary strategic goals include
coastal defense, intimidation of Taiwan,
and the gradual expansion of Chinese
power southward into the South China
Sea. In recent years, the PLAN has begun
to acquire the naval equipment necessary to achieve these limited goals. In
particular, Kane notes the rapid increase
in China’s mine warfare capability: “As
of the year 2000, almost 90 percent of
the major ships in China’s fleet could
carry mines as part of their standard armament.” In addition, all newly purchased naval equipment from Russia,
including the Kilo-class submarines and
the Sovremenny-class destroyers, “have
integral minelaying capabilities.” Such
capabilities may soon grow beyond the
point where the U.S. Navy and its Asian
allies can easily counter them.
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Although the Chinese navy still exhibits
serious vulnerabilities, especially in air
defenses, air forces, and electronic systems, concerted efforts are under way
to correct these problems. In addition,
should Beijing ever focus its land and
sea forces either on mainland Asia or
any of the thousand offshore islands,
the “PLA’s assault forces could also
prove overwhelming in battles for islands in the South China Sea, and perhaps for attacks on more distant islands
as well. China, in other words, is well
equipped to use land forces as part of a
joint maritime strategy.”
Lim and Kane have approached this
question from different angles—one
from the field of geopolitics and the
other from strategy—but they agree
that the PRC’s future ambitions most
likely include the construction of a
blue-water navy. Until that navy is
complete, China cannot hope to fight
and win a war at sea, especially against a
force as large and sophisticated as the
U.S. Navy. However, as Kane aptly suggests, a naval victory may not be part of
China’s grand strategy, since Beijing
“has reason to hope that it has found
limits to Washington’s willingness to
intervene.” So long as China keeps its
strategic goals small, it may succeed in
making incremental gains unopposed.
It is perhaps because of this threat of
incremental gains that Lim warns, “The
need to establish a stable power equilibrium in East Asia is an imperative of international security that the United
States cannot afford to ignore.”
BRUCE ELLEMAN

Naval War College

3

